Hadith 3355

(1) The statement: “The most hated of lawful things to Allah is divorce”: Ash-Shafi‘i says all divorce is permissible, as in Hidayah. Our view, per Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar, is that divorce is permissible per the general verses, though some say the most correct view is prohibition except for pressing need or major issue, with the first view being the adopted one, as in Bahr. Their statement, “Its default is prohibition,” means the lawgiver set aside this default and permitted it, even recommending it for a harmful or prayer-neglecting wife. In Radd al-Muhtar’s gloss: The first view (permissibility) is supported by “So divorce them at their prescribed periods” [At-Talaq: 1] and “There is no blame upon you if you divorce women…” [Al-Baqarah: 236]. The Prophet (ﷺ) divorced Hafsah without suspicion or major issue, as did the Companions. Al-Hasan ibn Ali frequently married and divorced. The Hadith, “The most hated of lawful things to Allah is divorce,” narrated by Abu Dawud, means “lawful” includes permissible, recommended, obligatory, and disliked acts, as Ash-Shamni said, per Bahr (summarized). The response is that being hated does not negate being lawful, as lawful includes the disliked, which is hated, unlike lawful acts where abstention is not preferred. This supports the second view, as will be further affirmed. Their statement responds to Fath’s claim that permissibility negates prohibition except for major issues or suspicion, citing the Prophet’s divorce of Hafsah without these. This contradicts their claim that its default is prohibition due to ingratitude for marriage’s blessing, with permissibility for need of escape. The Hadith “The most hated of lawful things to Allah is divorce” is addressed in Bahr: This default indicates legal prohibition, but the lawgiver set it aside, making permissibility the legislated ruling, like marriage’s default prohibition permitted for procreation. Does this imply marriage is prohibited? The truth is divorce’s permissibility without need for escape, per the cited evidence. I say: The difference is clear. Marriage’s default prohibition was entirely lifted, leaving no prohibition except for external reasons. Divorce’s permissibility is inherent as it removes bondage, but its prohibition persists for severing marriage, which holds religious and worldly benefits. This aligns with prayer on usurped land—permissible and prohibited from different aspects. Divorce’s default prohibition remains, unlike marriage’s, which was lifted for procreation and world continuity. Divorce’s default prohibition persists except for permitting reasons, i.e., the need for escape, meaning “Its default is prohibition, permitted for need of escape.” Without cause, it is folly, ingratitude, and harm to her, her family, and children. Thus, its cause is the need for escape due to incompatible temperaments or enmity causing failure to uphold Allah’s limits, not limited to major issues or suspicion, as chosen in Fath. Without a permitting need, it remains prohibited, per “Then if they obey you, do not seek means against them” [An-Nisa: 34], meaning do not seek separation, and the Hadith “The most hated of lawful things to Allah is divorce.” Fath states: “Permissible” applies to times when the need is verified. When present, divorce is permitted, explaining the Prophet’s and Companions’ actions to avoid attributing frivolous harm to them. Bahr’s claim that permissibility without need for escape is incorrect if escape means without cause, as it contradicts “Permitted for need of escape.” If it means with need, it is correct. Bahr’s claim that Fath’s validation is a weak opinion contradicts our scholars, as the weak view limits permissibility to major issues or suspicion, while Fath validates non-restriction, per their general need, as clarified, showing no contradiction between the adopted view and Fath’s validation, per Fath al-Qadir.