Hadith 3473

(1) The statement: “Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him, etc.”: Shaykh Ibn al-Humam said: If a vow is suspended on a condition, and the condition is met, he must fulfill the specific vow, due to the generality of this hadith and others, as it commands it without restriction to immediate or suspended vows. A suspended vow is like an immediate one for him, as if he said upon the condition: “It is upon me to do such-and-such.” It is narrated from Abu Hanifah (may Allah be pleased with him) that he retracted from it, meaning from the obligation to fulfill the specific vowed act if it is suspended on a condition, so he has the choice between performing it specifically or offering the expiation of an oath. This is the view of Muhammad. If he says: “If I do such-and-such, it is upon me to perform a pilgrimage or fast a year,” he may perform the pilgrimage or fast a year if he wishes, or offer expiation if he wishes. If he is poor, he has the choice between fasting a year or fasting three days. The first view, which is the obligation to fulfill it specifically, is mentioned in the apparent narration. The choice is narrated from Abu Hanifah in the rare narrations. It is narrated from Abdul Aziz ibn Khalid at-Tirmidhi, who said: I set out for pilgrimage, and when I entered Kufa, I read the book of vows and expiations to Abu Hanifah. When I reached this issue, he said: Stop, for it is my opinion to retract. When I returned from the pilgrimage, Abu Hanifah had passed away. Walid ibn Aban informed me that he retracted seven days before his death and said: He has the choice. This is what Ismail az-Zahid issued fatwas on. Walwalji said: The scholars of Balkh and Bukhara issue fatwas on this, and it is the choice of Shams al-A’immah, due to the prevalence of this issue in this era. The basis for the apparent view is the texts from the noble verse and hadiths. The basis for the rare narration is what is in Sahih Muslim from the hadith of Uqbah ibn Amir (may Allah be pleased with him), who said: “The expiation of a vow is the expiation of an oath.” This implies that it is absolved by expiation absolutely, creating a conflict. Thus, the absolute fulfillment specifically is interpreted as applying to immediate vows, and the absolution by expiation applies to suspended vows. There is no issue, as a suspended vow is non-existent at the time, so the vow is absent, making it like an oath in that the cause of obligation, which is breaking, is absent at the time of speaking, so it is associated with it, unlike an immediate vow, which is an established vow at its time, so the hadith of fulfillment applies to it. The author and the verifiers chose that the condition where expiation suffices is one not intended to occur, such as entering a house or speaking to so-and-so. If he does not intend its occurrence, he knows he does not intend the vowed act, as he made it a deterrent from fulfilling that condition, because suspending a vow on something he does not intend to occur is necessarily to prevent himself from it. A person does not always intend to obligate acts of worship, as they may be burdensome, exposing him to punishment, even though they bring reward. Hence, it is authentically reported that he prohibited vows and said: “It does not bring good” in the hadith. As for a condition he intends to occur, such as saying: “If Allah heals my sick person, my absent one returns, or my enemy dies, it is upon me to fast a month,” if the condition is met, only performing the specific vowed act suffices, because if he intends its occurrence, he intends the vow, making the vow equivalent to an immediate one, falling under its ruling, which is the obligation to fulfill it. Thus, what implies fulfillment applies to immediate vows and suspended vows intended to occur, and what implies the sufficiency of expiation applies to suspended vows not intended to occur, which is called by some jurists the vow of obstinacy. The hadith of the Ka’bah’s door latch is interpreted according to us as a suspended vow not intended to occur, so expiation suffices if he breaks it. Shafi’i said: If he does that act, he must offer the expiation of an oath, as if he broke his oath. Muhammad in “Al-Muwatta” adhered to the apparent narration and said: It is preferable to us that he fulfills what he obligated upon himself, gives charity with it, and retains what he misses. If he gains something, he gives charity with its equivalent. [Taken from various sources]

(2) The statement: “And whoever vows to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him”: This is evidence that whoever vows an act of obedience must fulfill it, even if it is not suspended on anything, and whoever vows a sin, fulfilling it is not permissible, nor is expiation required, as he would have clarified it if it were. [Stated in “Sharh as-Sunnah” and “Al-Mirqat”] Know that there is a difference between an oath and a vow. They agreed that expiation is required for breaking an oath, whether it is for obedience, disobedience, or a permissible act. As for a vow, if it is for obedience, it is binding by consensus, and if it is for disobedience, fulfilling it is not permissible. They disagreed regarding the obligation of expiation for it. Abu Hanifah, Malik, and Shafi’i said: No expiation is required. There are two narrations from Ahmad: one is that it forms, but fulfilling it is not permissible, and expiation is required; this is another narration from the Hanafis. The conclusion is that according to us, there are two views regarding a vow of disobedience: the first is Tahawi’s view of the obligation of expiation, and the second is that the basis of our school is that if one vows a sin, there is no fulfillment or expiation. [Taken from “Radd al-Muhtar” and “Al-Urf ash-Shadhi”]