Chapter on Vows

(1) The statement: And let them fulfill their vows: This command indicates obligation. Although this was revealed concerning a specific vow, it may be used as evidence that fulfilling a vow absolutely is obligatory, because it is a command to fulfill the vow, and the text, according to us, is not restricted to its context or cause. Thus, it indicates that fulfilling every vow is obligatory. They used the term “obligation” here in contrast to a mandated duty, because it is a general rule from which some specific cases are excluded, such as a vow to commit a sin or a non-intended act of worship, making it presumptive. Therefore, they applied the term “obligation” to it, indicating the ambiguity.

(2) The statement: “Do not make vows, for a vow does not avail anything against fate, etc.”: The meaning of his prohibition of vows is to emphasize its command and warn against neglecting it after making it obligatory. If it meant prohibiting it entirely, that would nullify its ruling and remove the obligation to fulfill it, as it would become a sin. The perspective of the hadith is that he informed them that it is something that does not bring them immediate benefit, nor repel harm, nor avert anything decreed by Allah, the Exalted. He says: Do not make vows thinking that by vowing you will attain something not decreed by Allah for you, or repel something decreed against you. If you do so, fulfill it, for what you vowed is binding upon you. Thus, prohibiting vows for this purpose encourages vowing, but with sincerity. Its clarification is that he justified the prohibition by saying: “For a vow does not avail anything against fate,” indicating that what is prohibited is the condition, meaning the corrupt belief that a vow can avail against fate. The conclusion is that the prohibition of vows is not related to their essence but to the corrupt belief arising from them. Thus, the prohibition is against vowing with the belief that it can avert fate, not against vowing absolutely. [Taken from “Al-Mirqat” and “Al-Luma’at”] For this reason, it is stated in “Radd al-Muhtar”: Know that a vow is a legislated act of worship. Its status as worship is due to its association with acts of worship like prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, emancipation, and the like. Its legislation is due to the commands to fulfill it. It is stated in “Umdat al-Qari”: Consensus has been established on the obligation to fulfill a vow if it is an act of obedience. Allah, the Exalted, said: Fulfill your contracts (Al-Ma’idah: 1), and said: They fulfill their vows (Al-Insan: 7), praising them for it. There is disagreement regarding initiating a vow. Some said it is recommended, while others said it is disliked, and Nawawi affirmed this. Shafi’i stated that it is contrary to what is preferable. Some later scholars interpreted the prohibition as applying to a vow of obstinacy, while they recommended a vow of piety. We will mention their explanation in this chapter, God willing, the Exalted.

(1) The statement: “There is no vow in disobedience, and its expiation is the expiation of an oath”: Know that if a vow is for an act of obedience, it is binding by consensus. If it is for a sin, fulfilling it is not permissible. There is disagreement regarding its formation. Its apparent meaning is that it does not form at all, and a vow of disobedience is invalid, with no expiation. This is the view of Shafi’i. It is also said that a vow of disobedience forms as an oath, with no fulfillment, but it requires expiation. This is the view of Abu Hanifah, and perhaps this narration is what Tahawi adopted. He said: If a vow is associated with sins, such as “It is upon me to kill so-and-so,” it is an oath, and expiation is required for breaking it. This is supported by the hadiths mentioned in this chapter. This is the essence of what is in “As-Sindhi,” “Al-Kawkab ad-Durri,” “Radd al-Muhtar,” and “Al-Mirqat.” Whoever seeks a detailed explanation of the school should refer to “Al-Urf ash-Shadhi.” The author of “Al-Mabsut” narrated that Sha’bi (may Allah be pleased with him) said: There is nothing upon a vow of disobedience, because sins are not obligated by a vow, and expiation is a substitute for the obligatory fulfillment of an oath or the obligatory fulfillment of a vow, which does not exist in disobedience. It is narrated that Abu Hanifah (may Allah be pleased with him) visited Sha’bi and asked him about this issue. He said: There is nothing upon him, because what is vowed is a sin. Abu Hanifah said: Is not the declaration of prohibition a sin, yet Allah commanded expiation for it? Sha’bi was perplexed and said: You are one of the opinionated. It is stated in “Al-Alamgiriyyah”: If one vows something that is a sin, it is not valid, but if he does it, expiation is required. It is stated in “Nayl al-Awtar”: There is disagreement regarding a vow of disobedience and whether expiation is required. The majority said: No. Ahmad, Thawri, Ishaq, some Shafi’is, and Hanafis said: Yes. Tirmidhi narrated the disagreement of the companions on this. They agreed on prohibiting a vow in disobedience, and their disagreement is only regarding the obligation of expiation. Those who obligated it cited the hadith of Aishah mentioned in this chapter and what is similar to it. The statement: “There is no vow in disobedience” does not mean it does not form at all, as that would not suit the statement “and its expiation is the expiation of an oath.” Rather, it means there is no fulfillment for it. This is explicit in some authentic narrations, which state: “There is no fulfillment for a vow in disobedience.” [Stated in “Fath al-Wadud”]

(2) The statement: “There is no fulfillment for a vow in disobedience”: This is because the validity of a vow and the obligation to fulfill it require conditions, including that the vow be an act of drawing closer to Allah, the Exalted, and that it not be a sin if it is inherently forbidden, with no aspect of worship. If it has an aspect of worship but is forbidden for another reason, the vow is valid, such as vowing to fast on the day of sacrifice. If he fasts, he fulfills the obligation but sins, and it is better to fulfill it by fasting another day. [Stated in “Al-Fath”] Another condition is that the vowed act not be obligatory upon him before the vow. If he vows the obligatory pilgrimage, the noon prayer, or the like, nothing else is required. Another condition is that the vowed act not exceed what he possesses or be something he does not own. If he says about another’s sheep: “It is upon me to slaughter it on the day of sacrifice,” the vow is not valid. Another condition is that it not be impossible, such as vowing to fast yesterday or perform retreat therein, which is not valid. Another condition is that the vowed act be of a type that is legally obligatory, meaning what includes the mandated and the obligatory in technical terms, specifically the mandated. Thus, the vower is not obligated by what is not of a type obligatory by the vow, such as vowing to escort a funeral or enter a mosque. Another condition is that it be an intended act of worship, so vowing ablution, shrouding the dead, ritual bathing, or the like is not binding. [Taken from “Umdat ar-Ri’ayah” and “Radd al-Muhtar”]

(3) The statement: “Nor in what a servant does not possess”: Its example is saying: “If Allah heals my sick person, such-and-such slave, who is not in my possession, is free.” If he later acquires it, he is not required to fulfill the vow, unlike if he suspends the emancipation of a slave he owns, as it is emancipated upon acquisition according to us. This is because a condition for the validity of a vow, according to us, is that the vowed act be owned by the vower or associated with the cause of ownership, such as saying: “If I buy you, it is upon me to emancipate you for Allah.” The disagreement regarding a vow is like the disagreement regarding divorce before marriage. The Hanafis, by analogy to the effects of suspending divorce on ownership or its cause, say: If the vowed act is associated with the cause of ownership, it is valid, and he must fulfill the vow. For example, if he says: “If I buy you, it is upon me to emancipate you for Allah,” when the purchase occurs, the vowed act occurs. Shafi’i said: This suspension is not valid, and he is not required to fulfill the vow, because suspension is like immediate execution. Just as immediate execution is not possible without ownership, suspension is not valid. The response is that suspension, such as saying: “If I buy you, it is upon me to emancipate you for Allah,” exists at the time, but the vowed act occurs when the condition is met, at which point ownership is realized, allowing fulfillment of the vow. This is unlike saying: “If Allah heals my sick person, such-and-such slave, who is not in my possession, is free,” as ownership has no effect there, neither immediately nor later, so the vow is not valid with this suspension, just as an immediate vow without ownership is not valid. Thus, the statement “nor in what a servant does not possess” is understood accordingly. Shafi’i’s inference from it is not valid. [Taken from “Al-Luma’at,” “Radd al-Muhtar,” “Al-Urf ash-Shadhi,” and others]

(1) The statement: “Whoever vows to obey Allah, let him obey Him, etc.”: Shaykh Ibn al-Humam said: If a vow is suspended on a condition, and the condition is met, he must fulfill the specific vow, due to the generality of this hadith and others, as it commands it without restriction to immediate or suspended vows. A suspended vow is like an immediate one for him, as if he said upon the condition: “It is upon me to do such-and-such.” It is narrated from Abu Hanifah (may Allah be pleased with him) that he retracted from it, meaning from the obligation to fulfill the specific vowed act if it is suspended on a condition, so he has the choice between performing it specifically or offering the expiation of an oath. This is the view of Muhammad. If he says: “If I do such-and-such, it is upon me to perform a pilgrimage or fast a year,” he may perform the pilgrimage or fast a year if he wishes, or offer expiation if he wishes. If he is poor, he has the choice between fasting a year or fasting three days. The first view, which is the obligation to fulfill it specifically, is mentioned in the apparent narration. The choice is narrated from Abu Hanifah in the rare narrations. It is narrated from Abdul Aziz ibn Khalid at-Tirmidhi, who said: I set out for pilgrimage, and when I entered Kufa, I read the book of vows and expiations to Abu Hanifah. When I reached this issue, he said: Stop, for it is my opinion to retract. When I returned from the pilgrimage, Abu Hanifah had passed away. Walid ibn Aban informed me that he retracted seven days before his death and said: He has the choice. This is what Ismail az-Zahid issued fatwas on. Walwalji said: The scholars of Balkh and Bukhara issue fatwas on this, and it is the choice of Shams al-A’immah, due to the prevalence of this issue in this era. The basis for the apparent view is the texts from the noble verse and hadiths. The basis for the rare narration is what is in Sahih Muslim from the hadith of Uqbah ibn Amir (may Allah be pleased with him), who said: “The expiation of a vow is the expiation of an oath.” This implies that it is absolved by expiation absolutely, creating a conflict. Thus, the absolute fulfillment specifically is interpreted as applying to immediate vows, and the absolution by expiation applies to suspended vows. There is no issue, as a suspended vow is non-existent at the time, so the vow is absent, making it like an oath in that the cause of obligation, which is breaking, is absent at the time of speaking, so it is associated with it, unlike an immediate vow, which is an established vow at its time, so the hadith of fulfillment applies to it. The author and the verifiers chose that the condition where expiation suffices is one not intended to occur, such as entering a house or speaking to so-and-so. If he does not intend its occurrence, he knows he does not intend the vowed act, as he made it a deterrent from fulfilling that condition, because suspending a vow on something he does not intend to occur is necessarily to prevent himself from it. A person does not always intend to obligate acts of worship, as they may be burdensome, exposing him to punishment, even though they bring reward. Hence, it is authentically reported that he prohibited vows and said: “It does not bring good” in the hadith. As for a condition he intends to occur, such as saying: “If Allah heals my sick person, my absent one returns, or my enemy dies, it is upon me to fast a month,” if the condition is met, only performing the specific vowed act suffices, because if he intends its occurrence, he intends the vow, making the vow equivalent to an immediate one, falling under its ruling, which is the obligation to fulfill it. Thus, what implies fulfillment applies to immediate vows and suspended vows intended to occur, and what implies the sufficiency of expiation applies to suspended vows not intended to occur, which is called by some jurists the vow of obstinacy. The hadith of the Ka’bah’s door latch is interpreted according to us as a suspended vow not intended to occur, so expiation suffices if he breaks it. Shafi’i said: If he does that act, he must offer the expiation of an oath, as if he broke his oath. Muhammad in “Al-Muwatta” adhered to the apparent narration and said: It is preferable to us that he fulfills what he obligated upon himself, gives charity with it, and retains what he misses. If he gains something, he gives charity with its equivalent. [Taken from various sources]

(2) The statement: “And whoever vows to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him”: This is evidence that whoever vows an act of obedience must fulfill it, even if it is not suspended on anything, and whoever vows a sin, fulfilling it is not permissible, nor is expiation required, as he would have clarified it if it were. [Stated in “Sharh as-Sunnah” and “Al-Mirqat”] Know that there is a difference between an oath and a vow. They agreed that expiation is required for breaking an oath, whether it is for obedience, disobedience, or a permissible act. As for a vow, if it is for obedience, it is binding by consensus, and if it is for disobedience, fulfilling it is not permissible. They disagreed regarding the obligation of expiation for it. Abu Hanifah, Malik, and Shafi’i said: No expiation is required. There are two narrations from Ahmad: one is that it forms, but fulfilling it is not permissible, and expiation is required; this is another narration from the Hanafis. The conclusion is that according to us, there are two views regarding a vow of disobedience: the first is Tahawi’s view of the obligation of expiation, and the second is that the basis of our school is that if one vows a sin, there is no fulfillment or expiation. [Taken from “Radd al-Muhtar” and “Al-Urf ash-Shadhi”]

(1) The statement: “Order him to speak, etc.”: This is evidence that anything that harms a person, which is not prescribed by the Book or Sunnah, such as walking barefoot or sitting in the sun, is not an act of obedience to Allah, the Exalted. If his vow is for something other than obedience, it is a sin, as disobedience is the opposite of obedience, so the vow does not form. He ordered Abu Isra’il in this hadith to complete the fast, which is understood as him knowing it was not burdensome for him. Qurtubi said regarding the story of Abu Isra’il: This is the greatest evidence for the majority that no expiation is required for one who vows a sin or something that is not obedience. [Taken from “Nayl al-Awtar” and “Umdat al-Qari”]

(2) The statement: “There is no vow except in what seeks, etc.”: This hadith and the previously mentioned hadith indicate that a vow does not form in permissible acts. If one vows a permissible act, such as saying: “It is upon me to walk to my house, ride my horse, or wear my garment,” there is nothing upon him according to Abu Hanifah and Malik. Shafi’i said: If he violates it, he is obligated by it and has the choice between fulfilling it or offering expiation. Among the evidence for the obligation to fulfill a vow of a permissible act is the story of the woman who vowed to play the tambourine. We say: Playing the tambourine is not among the acts of obedience associated with vows, and at best, it is permissible. However, as it was connected to expressing joy for the safe return of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) from one of his expeditions, and it involved humiliating the disbelievers and vexing the hypocrites, it became akin to some acts of worship. Similar to this is the statement of the Prophet (ﷺ) regarding satirizing the disbelievers: “Satirize Quraysh, for it is harder on them than a shower of arrows.” They disagreed about a man who vows as a polytheist and then becomes Muslim. Shafi’i and Ahmad said: If a man obligates something upon himself during his polytheism, such as retreat, charity, or something Muslims obligate for Allah, then becomes Muslim, it is obligatory upon him. Ibrahim an-Nakha’i, Thawri, Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf, Muhammad, Malik, Shafi’i in one opinion, and Ahmad in a narration said: Nothing is obligatory upon him. They argued with the hadith of Aishah: “And whoever vows to disobey Him, let him not disobey Him,” and the hadith of Shu’ayb: “A vow is only what seeks the countenance of Allah.” This indicates that vows are only obligatory if they are acts of drawing closer to Allah, the Exalted, and not obligatory if they are sins against Allah. If a disbeliever says: “It is upon me to fast” or “It is upon me to perform retreat,” if he does it, he is not drawing closer to Allah, as he intended what he worshipped besides Allah, which is a sin. This is indicated by the statement: “There is no vow in disobedience to Allah.” [Taken from “Rahmat al-Ummah,” “Nayl al-Awtar,” “Al-Mirqat,” “Umdat al-Qari,” and Tahawi]

(1) The statement: “She vowed to walk, etc.”: If one swears to walk to the House of Allah if he does such-and-such and then does it, nothing is required of him by analogy, because only what is of a type legally obligatory is obligated by a vow, and walking to the House is not legally obligatory. Since he is not obligated to fulfill specifically what he committed to, which is walking, it is even less likely that something else, such as pilgrimage or minor pilgrimage, is required. By istihsan, he is obligated to perform a pilgrimage or minor pilgrimage, as narrated from Ali (may Allah be pleased with him). This is because, in people’s custom, this expression implies committing to pilgrimage or minor pilgrimage. In vows and oaths, custom is considered, so we treat this as an expression for committing to pilgrimage or minor pilgrimage metaphorically, as the purpose of speech is people’s usage to express their inner intentions. When an expression becomes used metaphorically for something, it is treated as literal in that context. Then he has the choice between pilgrimage and minor pilgrimage, as they are the two rites related to the House, which are only performed through consecration and going to that place. They disagreed about one who vows to walk to the House of Allah. Shafi’i said: He walks if he can endure it, but if he is unable, he sheds blood and rides. The companions of Abu Hanifah (may Allah be pleased with them) said: He rides and sheds blood, whether he can endure walking or not. According to us, he has the choice: if he wishes, he walks, which is more complete and fulfills the vow; if he rides, he slaughters a sheep, because he introduced a deficiency in the pilgrimage or minor pilgrimage, as pilgrimage on foot is superior, since a rite with the attribute of walking is more complete. It is narrated that Abdullah ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them) after losing his sight said: “I do not regret anything as much as not performing pilgrimage on foot, for Allah, the Exalted, mentioned the walkers first, saying: They come to you on foot and on every lean camel (Al-Hajj: 27).” If he rides, he has introduced a deficiency, and deficiencies in rites are compensated with blood. This is due to his statement: “Let her ride and shed blood.” Shafi’i has two opinions: the first, which we hold, is that blood is required, and it is his more correct opinion; the second is that if he is unable to walk, no sacrificial animal is required, and nothing is established against him. The blood or sacrificial animal, according to us, is at least a sheep and at most a camel, so a sheep suffices, and the command for a camel is for recommendation. This is Shafi’i’s more apparent opinion. We also acted upon the generality of the sacrificial animal without specifying a camel due to the strength of its narration. They disagreed about the starting point of walking. Some said: From the ritual boundary. Others said: From where he consecrates, and this is the view of Imam Fakhr al-Islam (may Allah be pleased with him), Utabi, and others. Others said: From his house, and this is the view of Shams al-A’immah as-Sarakhsi, the author of “Al-Hidayah,” and authenticated by Qadi Khan, Zayla’i, and Ibn al-Humam, as it is the customary intent, and it is the preferred view. If he consecrates from his house, it is agreed that he walks from his house. If he rides the entire way or most of it, with or without an excuse, blood is required, as he neglected an obligation to fulfill the vow. If he rides for the lesser part, he gives charity equivalent to the value of a sheep. [Taken from “Al-Mabsut,” “Al-Mirqat,” commentaries on “Al-Kanz,” “Al-Muswi,” and “Ash’at al-Luma’at”] It is stated in “Al-Urf ash-Shadhi”: Some hadiths mention the sacrificial animal, some mention fasting three days, and some mention both. Tahawi said: Perhaps she vowed and swore. I say: The obligatory is the sacrificial animal, and fasting three days is a substitute for the sacrificial animal, not the expiation of an oath, as the apparent meaning is that expiation refers to the expiation of a violation, which is the sacrificial animal or its equivalent in fasting, to align the narrations. Tahawi is supported by what is in Abu Dawud from Ibn Abbas mentioning the oath, and I believe it is from Ibn Abbas’s ijtihad, as he knew the question was about the oath fundamentally, as it is not mentioned in the narrations.

(2) The statement: “The sacrificial animal is in place of walking”: Meaning without returning to walking when able. By analogy, he does not fulfill the vow’s obligation if he rides, but he must walk if he can, just as if he vows consecutive fasting and breaks the continuity. However, this is established by text for pilgrimage, so it must be followed. This is what Abu Dawud narrated from the hadith of Ibn Abbas that the sister of Uqbah ibn Amir vowed to walk to the House, and the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) ordered her to ride and offer a sacrificial animal. [Stated in “At-Ta’liq al-Mumajjad”]

(1) The statement: “The expiation of a vow, if not specified, is the expiation of an oath”: Meaning if he says: “It is upon me a vow” and does not specify it, its expiation is the expiation of an oath. Scholars differed on the meaning of this hadith. The majority of Shafi’i’s companions interpreted it as a vow of obstinacy, which is in the form of a condition and consequence, such as a person saying to abstain from speaking to Zayd: “If I speak to Zayd, it is upon me a pilgrimage or something else.” He has the choice between fulfilling the vow or offering expiation. Ahmad and some of Shafi’i’s companions interpreted it as a vow of disobedience. A group of hadith scholars interpreted it as applying to all types of vows, saying he has the choice in all vowed acts between fulfilling what he committed to or offering the expiation of an oath. Malik and many, or the majority, interpreted it as an absolute vow, as did the Hanafis, such as saying: “It is upon me a vow” or “A vow for Allah to do such-and-such.” The sworn-upon act must be mentioned, as it is a formed oath, because without specifying something, it requires expiation due to this hadith. It is either an absolute vow or suspended on a condition, and each is either with or without specifying something. If he does not specify anything, such as saying: “If I do such-and-such, it is upon me a vow,” he must offer the expiation of an oath, whether absolute or suspended. In an absolute vow, it is immediate; in a suspended vow, it is upon the condition’s occurrence. If he specifies something, in an absolute vow, he must fulfill it, and likewise in a suspended vow if the suspension is on a condition intended to occur. If it is not intended to occur, some said he must fulfill the vow, while others said the expiation of an oath suffices, and if he wishes, he fulfills the vowed act. This is the correct view, to which Abu Hanifah retracted three days before his death, or seven days. Similarly, if he says: “It is upon me an oath,” expiation is required, as it means “It is upon me the obligation of an oath.” [Taken from “Nayl al-Awtar,” “Badhl al-Majhud,” and commentaries on “Al-Kanz”] The verifier Ibn al-Humam said: If he says: “It is upon me a vow” or “A vow for Allah,” it is an oath if he mentions the sworn-upon act, such as saying: “It is upon me a vow for Allah to do such-and-such” or “not to do such-and-such.” If he does not fulfill what he swore upon, he must offer the expiation of an oath. This is if he does not intend by this absolute vow a specific act of worship, such as pilgrimage or fasting. If he intends by saying: “It is upon me a vow if I do such-and-such” a specific act of worship valid for a vow, and he does it, that act is required. Hakim said: Because when he intends a specific act of worship with the absolute expression, it is as if it is specified, as it is specified by inner speech. Thus, the hadith applies to cases where there is no intention with the word “vow.” [Summarized from “Al-Mirqat”]

(1) The statement: “He sought the verdict of the Prophet (ﷺ) regarding a vow upon his mother, etc.”: Qadi Iyad said: They differed about the vow of Sa’d’s mother. Some said it was an absolute vow, others said it was fasting, others said emancipation, and others said charity. Each claimant cited hadiths related to the story of Sa’d’s mother. The most apparent is that it was a vow concerning wealth or an unspecified vow. This is supported by what Darqutni narrated from the hadith of Malik, where he said to him, meaning the Prophet (ﷺ): “Distribute water on her behalf.” Our Hanafi scholars specified it to financial acts of worship, not purely physical ones. Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with him) said: “No one fasts on behalf of another, nor prays on behalf of another.” The detail is that a vow is either a physical act of worship or a financial one. If it is a physical act, the heirs may not fulfill it on her behalf due to the prohibition. Nasa’i narrated in his “Sunan al-Kubra” from Ibn Abbas: “No one fasts on behalf of another, nor prays on behalf of another,” and something similar from Ibn Umar. If it is financial and the deceased did not make a bequest, the heirs are not obligated to fulfill it. If the deceased made a bequest to fulfill her vow, the heirs must fulfill it from one-third of his wealth, feeding for each day one sa’ of non-wheat grain or half a sa’ of wheat. This is the view of Abu Hanifah. Shafi’i in his later opinion said: The guardian feeds on behalf of the deceased each day one mudd of wheat for a poor person, and no one fasts on behalf of another. In his earlier opinion: If someone misses something from Ramadan, is able to make it up, then dies without doing so, or similarly for a vow or expiation, it is made up by his guardian, either by fasting on his behalf or feeding from his estate. Nawawi said: The earlier opinion here is more apparent. [Taken from “Al-Mirqat,” “At-Ta’liq al-Mumajjad,” “Badhl al-Majhud,” “Umdat al-Qari,” and “Al-Muswi”]

(1) The statement: “Charity to Allah and His Messenger”: This indicates that intending to draw closer to other than Allah as a secondary matter in worship does not harm, provided the primary intent is to draw closer to Allah. [Stated by As-Sindhi]

(2) The statement: “Then I will retain my share in Khaybar”: Meaning from real estate and other things. It is stated in “Umdat al-Qari”: Vows are of two types: a vow of piety and a vow of obstinacy. The first is divided into two: the first is what is initiated to draw closer, such as saying: “It is upon me to fast such-and-such” absolutely, or “to fast in gratitude if Allah heals my sick person,” or the like. It is said: There is consensus on its validity in both cases. Some Shafi’is said in the second case it does not form. The second is what is suspended to draw closer, such as saying: “If so-and-so returns from his journey, it is upon me to fast such-and-such.” This is binding by consensus. A vow of obstinacy is also divided into two: the first is its suspension on a forbidden act or neglecting an obligation, which does not form. The second is what is suspended on a permissible act, neglecting a recommended act, or something contrary to what is preferable. There are three opinions among scholars: fulfillment, expiation of an oath, or the choice between them according to Shafi’is. According to Malikis, it does not form at all. According to Hanafis, expiation of an oath is required in all cases. It is stated in “Al-Muswi”: If a man swears by giving his wealth as charity or says: “My wealth is for the cause of Allah,” some said: He must offer the expiation of an oath, and it is a vow of obstinacy, and this is Shafi’i’s view. Malik said: He gives one-third of his wealth. Abu Hanifah said: This applies to everything subject to zakat from its essence, excluding what is not subject to zakat, such as real estate, animals, and the like. It is stated in “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar” and “Radd al-Muhtar”: If he says: “My wealth is charity for the poor,” and he has no wealth, it is not valid by consensus. If he has wealth, it is valid, and it is understood as referring to the type of wealth subject to zakat by istihsan, whether it reaches the nisab or not, whether he has overwhelming debt or not. If he has nothing else, he retains enough for his sustenance. If he acquires more, he gives charity equivalent to what he retained. Its verification is that their disagreement is extensive regarding the interpretation of wealth. Ibn Abdul Barr and others said: In the language of the Daws tribe, Abu Hurayrah’s tribe, wealth excludes currency, such as goods and clothes. According to a group, wealth is currency, such as gold and silver specifically. Mutarrizi narrated that wealth is the silent, like gold and silver, and the speaking. Qali narrated from Thalab that he said: Wealth among the Arabs is at least what is subject to zakat, and what is less than that is not called wealth. Ibn Sayyidah said in “Al-Areez”: The Arabs do not apply the term wealth absolutely except to camels, due to their nobility and great utility. He said: Sometimes they apply it to all types of livestock, and some apply it to everything a person owns, due to Allah’s statement, the Exalted: And do not give the foolish your wealth (An-Nisa: 5), which does not specify anything over another. This is the choice of many later scholars. Thus, it is clear that Bukhari chose one opinion, saying: The conclusion is that wealth applies to everything owned. Similarly, Abu Hanifah chose one opinion, saying: If one swears or vows to give all his wealth as charity, his oath and vow apply only to what is subject to zakat specifically. [Taken from “Umdat al-Qari”]

(1) The statement: “Fulfill your vow, etc.”: Tayyibi (may Allah be pleased with him) said: This is evidence that fulfilling a vow in a specific place is obligatory. The command is for obligation, perhaps this is Shafi’i’s view. We say: It is known from the Shariah that committing to an act of worship is obligatory, and it is not established in the Shariah that a servant’s specification of a place for worship is considered. Rather, that is known for Allah, the Exalted. Thus, the obligation of the essence of the act of worship by committing to it does not extend to the obligation of specifying a place, so it is nullified, and what remains obligatory is the act of worship itself. Thus, the command in the hadith is for permissibility. [Taken from “Al-Mirqat”] It is stated in “Radd al-Muhtar” in the book of sacrifice: Know that a sacrificial animal is a term for what is slaughtered at a specific time, and the time is not nullified. If one vows it, he must perform it at that time, otherwise he has not fulfilled the vowed act, as it is not called a sacrificial animal afterward. Hence, it is given as charity alive if its time passes, unlike if one vows to slaughter a sheep at a specific time, where mentioning the time is nullified, as it is an additional attribute to the sheep’s essence. Hence, our scholars nullified specifying time and place, unlike a sacrificial animal, as the time is part of its concept, so it must be considered. Similarly, if one vows a sacrificial sheep, they said: He fulfills the obligation only by slaughtering it in the sanctuary and giving it as charity there, although they said: If one vows to give a dirham as charity to the poor of Mecca, he may give it to others. This is because a sacrificial animal is a term for what is offered to Mecca and given as charity there, so the place is part of its concept, like time in a sacrificial animal. If he gives it as charity outside Mecca, he has not fulfilled what he vowed, unlike vowing to give a dirham as charity there, as the place is not part of the dirham’s concept. A dirham is a dirham whether given as charity in Mecca or elsewhere, unlike a sacrificial animal. Thus, the validity of the tenth day and the obligation to slaughter it on the days of sacrifice are clear. The author of “Radd al-Muhtar” said: Seize this noble benefit, which is a result of my humble thought, as I have not seen it in any book, and praise be to Allah, the Sovereign, the Bestower.

(2) The statement: “He said: Pray here, etc.”: Ibn al-Humam said: If one vows two rak’ahs in the Sacred Mosque and performs them in a less noble place or one with no nobility, it suffices. [Stated in “Al-Mirqat”] It is stated in “Al-Alamgiriyyah”: Our scholars differed about one who vows fasting or prayer in a specific place. Abu Hanifah and Muhammad said: He may fast and pray in any place he wishes. [Stated in “As-Siraj al-Wahhaj”] Tahawi preferred it, and its evidence is mentioned in “Sharh Ma’ani al-Athar.” It is stated in “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar” in the book of oaths: Because an unsuspended vow is not restricted to anything. Its detail is in “Radd al-Muhtar”: A vow for retreat, pilgrimage, prayer, fasting, or others, unsuspended, even if specified, is not restricted to time, place, dirham, or poor person. If one vows to give charity on Friday in Mecca with this dirham to so-and-so and violates it, it is valid. Likewise, if he advances it before, or specifies the month of retreat or fasting and advances it, it is valid. Similarly, if he vows to perform pilgrimage in a specific year and performs it in a prior year, or prayer on a specific day and prays it before, as it is advancing after the cause, which is the vow, so the specification is nullified. This is unlike a suspended vow, which cannot be advanced before the condition’s occurrence. The difference is that a suspended vow does not form a cause immediately, as established in principles, but upon the condition’s occurrence. If advancing it were permissible, it would occur before its cause, which is not valid. It is clear from this that in a suspended vow, the time is specified regarding advancing, but delaying it is apparently permissible, as there is no issue in it. It is also clear that the place, dirham, and poor person are not specified, as the suspension only affects the formation of causality, preventing advancing and specifying the time. The place, dirham, and poor person remain on the default of non-specification. Just as the poor person is not specified, their number is not specified. It is stated in “Al-Khaniyah”: If he says: “If I marry my daughter, a thousand dirhams of my wealth are charity, one dirham for each poor person,” and he marries her and gives the thousand to one poor person entirely, it is valid.

(1) The statement: “Slaughter a ram, for it will suffice you, etc.”: Meaning whoever vows to slaughter his son must slaughter a sheep, due to the story of Khalil (may Allah be pleased with him), and the second vow is nullified. Shafi’i said: It is as if he vowed to kill him, and it is nullified, whether it was to slaughter himself or his slave. Muhammad obligated a sheep. If it was to slaughter his father, grandfather, or mother, it is nullified by consensus, as they are not his earnings. [Stated in “Ad-Durr al-Mukhtar”] It is stated in “Radd al-Muhtar” and “Al-Ikhtiyar”: If one vows to slaughter his son or the like, he must slaughter a sheep according to Abu Hanifah and Muhammad. Similarly, vowing to slaughter himself or his slave according to Muhammad. Regarding parents, there are two narrations from Abu Hanifah, and the correct one is that it is not valid. Abu Yusuf and Zufar said: None of this is valid, as it is a sin, so it is not valid. For them, regarding the son, it is the view of a group of companions, such as Ali, Ibn Abbas, and others (may Allah be pleased with them), and it is not known by analogy, so it is by transmission. This is because obligating the slaughter of a son is an expression for obligating the slaughter of a sheep. If he vows to slaughter him in Mecca, he must slaughter the sheep in the sanctuary. Its evidence is the story of the sacrificial son, as Allah, the Exalted, obligated Khalil to slaughter his son and ordered him to slaughter a sheep, where He said: You have fulfilled the vision (As-Saffat: 105). Thus, it is so in our Shariah, either by Allah’s statement, the Exalted: Then We revealed to you, “Follow the religion of Ibrahim, inclining toward truth” (An-Nahl: 123), or because the Shariah of those before us is binding upon us until abrogation is established. It has parallels, such as obligating walking to the House of Allah being an expression for pilgrimage or minor pilgrimage, and obligating a sacrificial animal being an expression for obligating a sheep, and many similar cases. If vowing to slaughter a son is an expression for slaughtering a sheep, it is not a sin but an act of worship. Isbijabi and other scholars said: If he intends the actual slaughter and knows it is a sin, it is not valid. Its parallel is fasting for an elderly person, which is a sin as it leads to his destruction, yet vowing to fast is valid, and he must offer a redemption. This is considered an obligation for redemption, as here. For Muhammad, regarding himself and his slave, his authority over them is greater than over his son. For Abu Hanifah, the obligation of a sheep is contrary to analogy, known by inference from the story of Khalil. It was mentioned regarding the son, so it is limited to it. If he vows with the term “killing,” nothing is required by consensus, as the text uses the term “slaughter,” and “sacrifice” is similar, unlike “killing.” This is because slaughter and sacrifice are mentioned in the Quran as acts of worship and devotion, while killing is mentioned only as punishment, retribution, and prohibition. If one vows to slaughter a sheep with the term “killing,” it is not valid, so this is even more so.